Although current online social networks (OSNs) 
Introduction
The online social networks (OSNs) provide each user with a virtual space where the user can post data like photos and videos, and share with his friends and group members [1] . The popularity of OSNs is obtained from the convenience as well as efficiency of data dissemination and sharing based on the relationships built among users [2] .
Nevertheless, the main obstacle of sharing data in OSNs is data security [3] . The users entrust their data to the OSNs service provider and customize their own access policies to share data with others. However, the OSNs service provider is usually a semi-trusted server who will honestly follow the designated protocol, but might collect the users' data and share with others. Hence, in order for OSNs to serve as a trustworthy channel for disseminating data, it is crucial to have an effective strategy to protect data security.
On the other hand, fine-grained access control is another key challenge in OSNs. The OSNs currently provide simple access control mechanisms allowing users to regular their data in OSNs by restricting data sharing to a specific set of trusted users. The OSNs often use user relationship and group membership to distinguish between trusted and untrusted users. However, most access control schemes in OSNs are achieved by requiring the user
Related Work
The OSN is a multi-user service which provides social interactions. Data security is important when sharing data to make friends. A normal solution to protect the data security is to encrypt data before outsourcing data to OSNs service provider.
Tran et al. suggested a framework that allows users of cloud-based social networks to share their private data in a secure manner based on PRE [6] . In this framework, the users use the same public key to encrypt data but different private key to decrypt data. When a user accesses the data, the encrypted data will be reencrypted according to the user's private key before sending to the user. Dien et al. also proposed a framework for secure sharing data on cloud-based social networks [7] . In their framework, the data is encrypted by a dynamic one -time symmetric key before sending to the cloud, and the user encrypts the symmetric key with his own secret key and then sends the ciphertext to the proxy server. The proxy server reencrypts the ciphertext for those who are accessing the data. Although these schemes based on PRE technique can protect data security, the y do not provide finegrained access control of the encrypted data.
Many efforts have been made to present different access control schemes in OSNs. Wang et al. provided an access control scheme based on users' relationship and resource's content [8] . If a requestor wants to gain the right of access resources, he needs to meet the requirement of users' relationship, and have a certain correlation with the resource's content. On the other hand, in order to meet the multiparty access control requirement, Hu et al. proposed an approach to enable the protection of shared data associated with multiple users in OSNs [1] . This scheme formulates an access control model to capture the essence of multiparty authorization requirements, along with a multiparty policy sp ecification scheme and a policy enforcement mechanism. Meanwhile, this scheme provides a voting mechanism to deal with authorization and privacy conflicts. Hu et al. improved this scheme by presenting a logic representation that allows the operators to leverage the features of existing logic solvers to perform various analysis tasks [9] . However, these access control schemes in OSNs need to manually update and maintain the ACL, which is complex and inflexible.
ABE has been adopted in recent efforts concerning access control in OSNs. The notion of ABE was first introduced by Sahai and Waters [10] . In the ABE scheme, ciphertexts and users' decryption keys are associated with a set of attributes or an access policy over attributes, and a user is able to decrypt a ciphertext only if there is a match between his attributes and the access policy. Persona is a state -of-the-art design that proposes the use of ABE to enable fine-grained access control in OSNs [11] . A user can create groups by assigning different attributes and keys to his social contacts, and then encrypt data such that only particular users having the desired set of attributes can decrypt it. Jahid et al. proposed an architecture called EASiER that supports fine-grained access policies and dynamic group membership by using ABE [12] . This scheme creates a proxy that participates in the decryption process. Meanwhile, the proxy cannot decrypt ciphertext or provide access to previously revoked users. Guo et al. proposed a privacy-preserving content dissemination scheme in mobile OSNs based on ABE [13] . Shuai et al. proposed a novel access control mechanism called Masque employing ABE, as a hierarchical solution for interactive sharing of encrypted data in OSNs [4] . This scheme allows the OSNs service provider to manage users at a high level without being able to access their sensitive data. At the same time, this scheme enables users to customize their own access policy specifically based on CP-ABE. These above schemes protect data security and provide fine-grained access control in the OSNs. However, they do not support multiparty access control of encrypted data.
User revocation is an essential mechanism in OSNs. Liang et al. proposed an efficient and secure user revocation scheme based on ABE in mobile soc ial networks [14] . The proposed scheme enables a trusted authority to efficiently revoke a specific user's data decryption capability in each time slot, and also disables malicious users from decrypting any data packet. However, this scheme requires the trusted authority to periodically control the user's data decryption capability, which is inefficient. Therefore, immediate user revocation is proposed in many practical attribute-based systems. Ibraimi et al. introduces a mediator which maintains a revocation list so as to implement immediate attributes revocation [15] . Yu et al. introduced the semi-trusted agent based on PRE to achieve user revocation [16] . The proxy agent re-encrypts the ciphertext by the latest proxy key, and refreshes all the private keys held by the legal users. Shuai et al. improved the Masque and achieved immediate user revocation by updating corresponding secret parameters related to the revoked attributes [17] . However, these immediate user revocation schemes will cause the key update operation of large numbers of users in OSNs. Using our scheme, user revocation can be achieved immediately without issuing new attribute secret keys. (3) Non-degeneracy. The map does not send all pairs in 11  GG to the identity in 2 G .
Secret Sharing
A t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme can split a secret s into n distinct shares, and a user must retrieve at least t of n shares to reconstruct the secret.
The Shamir's secret sharing scheme [18] creates a random polynomial P of degree t such that (0) Ps
Px , it is possible to recover (0) P using Lagrange interpolation:
The Benaloh and Leichter's secret sharing scheme [19] transforms an access policy into an access tree T and sets the value of the root node of T to be s. Then recursively for each non-leaf node does the following:
(1) If the symbol is  , set the values of each child node to be s. Thus the user whose attributes satisfy the access policy T can recover the secret s.
Ciphertext-policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-encryption
The CP-ABPRE extends traditional PRE by allowing a semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext under an access policy to the one with the same plaintext under another access policy [20] . The users identified by attributes could designate the proxy who can re-encrypt a ciphertext related with a certain access policy to another one with a different access policy. The CP-ABPRE scheme is a tuple of six algorithms [21] :
(1) System setup. The algorithm takes as input the security parameter K, outputs the system public key PK which is distributed to all users, and the master secret key MK which is kept secret.
(2) Key generation. The algorithm takes as input the MK and the attribute set S identifying the user, and it outputs the SK associated with the attribute set.
(3) Encryption. The algorithm takes as input the PK, a message M and an access policy T over a list of attributes which specifies the attributes the user needs to possess in order to obtain M. The algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT associated with the T. 
Overview of Proposed Scheme

Security Model
In this paper, we assume attribute authority to be a trusted authority which is responsible for issuing attribute secret keys to users. We also assume OSNs service provider in cloud computing to be semi-trusted and curious-but-honest. That is, it will honestly execute the tasks, but would like to disclose users' personal data. In addition, the users may try to access data either within or outside the scope of their access privileges, so malicious users may collude with each other to access data beyond their privileges.
System Model
The system model of the proposed scheme consists of the following entities, as shown in Figure 1 . Attribute authority. The attribute authority is a trusted third party, which sets up the system parameters (such as the PK and MK), and issues SK to the users corresponding to their attribute set.
OSNs service provider. The OSNs service provider is a semi-trusted server, which provides the OSN service and manages the users and groups. Besides, the OSNs service provider stores the encrypted data from the owners, and also reencrypts the ciphertext in the data server with the disseminators' access policies when the disseminators share the data with other users.
International Journal of Security and Its Applications Vol. 9, No.12 (2015) 228 Copyright ⓒ 2015 SERSC User. The user can register with the OSNs service provider to generate his basic attributes, and can make friends with other users in OSNs. We define the roles of user as follows:
(1) Owner. The owner is the user who outsources data to his space in OSNs.
(2) Disseminator. The disseminator is the user who shares the other's data to his space in OSNs.
(3) Accessor. The accessor is the user who satisfies the access policy and accesses the owner's data in OSNs.
We define the proposed scheme by describing the following seven algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, RKGen, ReEncrypt, Decrypt. The OSNs service provider initiates the OSN service and the attribute authority specifies the system attributes in the Setup algorithm. The attribute authority generates the SK for the registered user by running the KeyGen algorithm. If an owner wants to publish his data, he will run Encrypt algorithm to encrypt the data with random DK using symmetric encryption algorithm and then encrypt the DK with customized access policy based on CP-ABE. If a disseminator wants to share an owner or other disseminator 's data with his friends or group members by assigning new access policy, he will run the RKGen algorithm to generate the RK with the new access policy. Then the OSNs service provider will run ReEncrypt algorithm to re-encrypt the ciphertext with the RK for the accessor. If an accessor's attributes satisfy the access policy of encrypted data, he can run Decrypt algorithm to decrypt the DK and further decrypt the encrypted data.
Construction
In this section, we will provide a detailed construction for our proposed scheme.
Setup(K)
The algorithm selects a bilinear group 1 G of prime order p and generator g, and the bilinear map G . The PK is published as:
The MK is kept secret by attribute authority and is constructed as:
. The OSNs service provider generates random polynomial P of degree t (the maximum number of revoked users), and a random secret s.
KeyGen(S, MK)
The user can register with the OSNs service provider which generates a random user identity  for the user. Moreover, the attribute authority assigns a set of attributes S to the user. The attribute authority takes as input the attribute set S, and chooses a random p  Z , and computes the SK which is constructed as:
The OSNs service provider also generates the UK for the user with  which is constructed as: ( , ( )) UK P
 
Then the user keeps the SK and UK secret. 
RKGen(SK, T A , T B , PK)
In order to customize the access policy when disseminating the data of an owner or a disseminator, the disseminator can generate the RK to re-encrypt the ciphertext associated with T A to ciphertext associated with T B , if SK B matches the T A .
We denote the attribute set of The i  values are shares of  and are generated using Benaloh and Leichter secret sharing scheme. Then the algorithm computes the re-encryption key RK which consists of the following components:
ReEncrypt(RK, CT)
When receiving the RK from the disseminator, the OSNs service provider will reencrypt the ciphertext in the data server with RK.
The algorithm first computes the following: 

Then the algorithm computes the following:
Then the algorithm computes the re-encrypted ciphertext CT':
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Decrypt(SK, CT)
In the OSNs, the accessor can conveniently view and share others' data such as photos and videos. Since the data is encrypted, only the accessor whose attributes satisfy the T can decrypt the ciphertext. 

  Then the algorithm computes the following: 
User Revocation
Our immediate user revocation method revokes certain users based on secret sharing without issuing new attribute secret keys to unrevoked users. The scheme includes the following two algorithms: Update, Decrypt. Whenever an owner or a disseminator wants to revoke some users, the OSNs service provider will update the ciphertext by running Update algorithm. The unrevoked users can run Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext with their attribute secret keys, while the revoked users cannot.
Update(UL, CT)
If the owner or disseminator, for example Alice, wants to revoke some users, she will send the revoked user list UL to the OSNs service provider. The OSNs service provider then generates the AK with the revoked users' UK. 
Decrypt(SK, UK, CT)
After the OSNs service provider updates the ciphertext, the user, for example Bob, can share Alice's data as follows. The algorithm first computes the  with the AK and the user's UK.
Then the algorithm recovers P(0):
Thus if Bob is unrevoked, he can compute (0) Ps  , and then recover the DK. (1) If CT is an original ciphertext and Bob's attributes satisfy the access policy of CT, the algorithm computes:
If CT is a re-encrypted ciphertext and Bob's attributes satisfy the access policy of CT, the algorithm computes: 
Security and Performance Analysis
Security Analysis
(1) Data confidentiality. In our scheme, the owner encrypts his data before outsourcing. In the encryption phase, the owner encrypts his data with DK using symmetric encryption algorithm, and then encrypts the DK with access policy based on CP-ABE. The disseminator and accessor can decrypt the data if and only if they have a matching set of attributes. In the re-encryption phase, the OSNs service provider reencrypts the ciphertext for the accessor with the RK generated by the disseminator, while the semi-trusted OSNs service provider cannot disclose the DK, which ensures the DK confidentiality.
(2) Unidirectionality. In the re-encryption phase, the OSNs service provider can re-encrypt ciphertext CT A associated with T A into ciphertext CT B associated with T B using the re-encryption key RK A->B . But it cannot re-encrypt the CT B into CT A since RK B->A is impossible to compute.
(3) Re-encryption control. If OSNs service provider receives a re-encryption key RK A->B of ciphertext CT A from the disseminator, it cannot forge a new re-encryption key RK A->C based on RK A->B to re-encrypt ciphertext CT A to ciphertext CT C . This is because that the key components i  in the RK A->B are assigned by the disseminator. Thus, the disseminator can determine whether the encrypted data can be re-encrypted, while the OSNs service provider can't forge any re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext arbitrarily.
(4) Collusion resistance. In the key generation phase, the attribute authority issues the attribute secret key SK of each user with a random  . Thus even if two or more users collude sharing their attributes, the collusion attack will not take effect since the value ˆ(
, ) e g g
  
 cannot be recovered. Hence, the users cannot go through the access policy of 
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Copyright ⓒ 2015 SERSC encrypted data by combining their SK to decrypt the data that they are not individually supposed to access. (5) Master key security. In the re-encryption phase, the disseminator generates reencryption key RK and sends it to OSNs service provider. However, the OSNs service provider cannot get key component D of disseminator from the RK, since it is protected by g   . In the decryption phase, the accessor cannot recover g   though he can decrypt ciphertext successfully. Thus, the accessor cannot collude with OSNs service provider to obtain the disseminator's attribute secret key.
(6) Forward secrecy. In the user revocation phase, when a user comes to drop a set of attributes which satisfying the access policy in the ciphertext, the key component in the ciphertext is re-encrypted by the OSNs service provider with (, ) s e g g C  . Then the user cannot recover P(0) and decrypt any ciphertext corresponding to the attributes after the revocation. In addition, even if the user has recovered ( 2 ) ,() e g g Z      before the revocation and stores it, he cannot generate the desired value CC  to decrypt the subsequent ciphertext. Therefore, the forward secrecy of the shared data is guaranteed in our scheme.
Performance Analysis
We provide the performance analysis from both theoretical calculation and experimental evaluation. We evaluate the computation time of key generation, encryption, re-encryption, decryption and user revocation in our construction, and conduct the experiment on a virtual machine powered by Ubuntu 12.10 with 32-bit, Core i5 based on pairing-based cryptography library. We adopt the type A elliptic curve parameter where the group order is 160 bits. We use E 1 to denote the group exponentiation in 1 G , E 2 to denote the group exponentiation in 2 G , a to denote the number of attributes in S and n to denote the number of attributes in AS. 
Comparison
We compare our scheme with several access control schemes in OSNs, in terms of data confidentiality, access control, user revocation, multiple users. The comparison results are shown in Table 1 . Compared with access control schemes based on ABE [11, 12, 13, 17] , our scheme encrypts the data with DK using symmetric encryption algorithm, and encrypts the DK based on CP-ABE, which is more efficient. Besides, our scheme supports the multiparty access control based on CP-ABPRE, and allows multiple controllers include the owner and the disseminator to customize access policies.
On the other hand, compared with current multiparty access control scheme [9] , our scheme encrypts the data before sharing, which protects the data from the illegal users and semi-trusted OSNs service provider. Moreover, our scheme supports immediate user revocation without issuing new attribute secret keys to unrevoked users, which is more flexible and efficient in OSNs.
